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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Anecdotal and case study evidence across countries suggests that rent-seeking activities 
intensify before elections. For instance, lobbying efforts, interest group activity, participation 
in strikes and demonstrations, etc, indicate that the redistributive struggle escalates in pre-
election periods. At the same time, there is econometric evidence of electoral cycles in 
economic policy. For instance, government spending increases, as political parties become 
short sighted before elections.
1 
Motivated by the above, in this paper we study whether endogenous fiscal policy can 
operate as a transmission mechanism through which short-sighted pre-election motives on the 
part of policymakers lead to stronger rent-seeking activities and lower capital accumulation 
and economic growth. We first develop a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model that 
studies the joint determination of fiscal policy, rent-seeking activities and economic growth, 
when the driving force is uncertainty about remaining in power. Then, we test the predictions 
of this model by using a data set of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982-1996. 
The theoretical model is built upon the neoclassical growth model enriched with 
public goods financed by optimally chosen income taxes. To this tractable model, we add two 
things. First, private agents, apart from making their usual consumption/saving decisions, 
also decide how much effort to allocate to productive work relative to rent seeking activities. 
In doing so, rent seekers compete with each other for extra fiscal favours.
2 Second, there are 
two political parties that can alternate in power, so that they choose economic policy by 
competing with each other and knowing that there is only a non-zero probability of remaining 
in power in the coming election. We thus combine rent seeking and electoral uncertainty. We 
also allow for both exogenous and endogenous (state-contingent) re-election probabilities.
3 
The main prediction is that as the probability of remaining in power decreases (or 
equivalently electoral uncertainty increases), the incumbent party finds it optimal to go for a 
relatively large size of the public sector. This signals a larger pie that rational atomistic 
individuals are willing to fight over. Thus, relatively large public sectors in pre-election 
                                                 
1 For surveys, see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Drazen (2000, chapter 7) and Mueller 
(2003, chapter 19).  
2 Our rent seeking mechanism is as in e.g. Tullock (1980) and Murphy et al. (1991). See also Mohtadi and Roe 
(1998, 2003), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005) for similar setups in which rent seekers compete with each 
other for fiscal favors. That is, the common pool is the tax base. For surveys of the literature of rent seeking and 
growth, see Drazen (2000, chapter 11) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14.4). For a survey of the 
literature of rent seeking, see Mueller (2003, chapter 15). 
3 Our key electoral mechanism is as in e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and 
Wen (1998), Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000), Economides et al. (2003) and Malley et al. (2007).    2
periods distort private incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent 
seeking activities. In turn, distorted private incentives hurt the macro-economy by adversely 
affecting capital accumulation and economic growth. 
The above predictions are tested for a group of 25 OECD countries with three 5-year 
periods for each country over 1982-1996. For this group of countries, we use two proxies of 
uncertainty about remaining in power. First, we construct a measure of electoral uncertainty 
defined as the average of pre-election dummies over the time periods (see also Fatas and 
Mihov (2003)) by following the empirical literature on political business cycles (see e.g. 
Alesina et al. (1997)). In addition, we use a more general measure of the stability of the 
governments as a proxy for uncertainty about remaining in power and hence shorter horizons. 
This is obtained from Beck et al. (2000) and captures the extent of turnover of a 
government’s decision makers, as the percentage of the main veto gates (legislature, 
executive) in a system that have changed hands in any year. Following the literature on weak 
institutions (see e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005 and the papers cited therein), 
we use the IRIS dataset, constructed by Knack and Keefer (1995), to obtain the ICRG index 
as a proxy for rent seeking. Rent seeking from the government budget is expected to be 
associated with low quality of governance, high corruption and low protection of property 
rights (which is what the ICRG index measures).  
Our empirical results support this causality scenario. In particular, as uncertainty 
about remaining in power increases, the government share in GDP also increases, which in 
turn exerts an adverse effect on rent-seeking incentives, as this is captured by a decrease in 
the ICRG index. Then, increased rent-seeking activity hurts economic growth. 
What is the value added of our paper? Our work differs from the existing studies of 
institutions, rent seeking, fiscal policy and economic growth, because we study a potential 
channel behind the reduced form relationships that has not been examined so far in the 
theoretical
4 or empirical
5 literature. The type of endogeneity of fiscal size, as predicted by our 
                                                 
4 In the political business cycle literature, electoral instability hurts growth by inducing incumbents to follow 
shortsighted policies. However, most of this literature abstracts from rent seeking. On the other hand, in the rent-
seeking literature, a larger public sector and higher transfers can worsen private incentives and this is bad for 
growth (see e.g. Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005) and the papers cited in 
Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14.4)). However, most of these models abstract from elections and their 
effects on private incentives.  
5 For the effects of electoral competition on the conduct of fiscal policy, see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997). For the 
effects of political variables and the size of government on rent seeking activities, see e.g. Treisman (2000) and 
Glaeser and Saks (2006). For the effects of weak institutions and extractive activities on economic growth and 
development, see e.g. Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) Rodrik (1999), 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003). For   3
model, can reconcile several findings of the empirical literature. For instance, single-equation 
Least Squares regressions that do not deal with the potential endogeneity of government size 
have so far provided mixed results for the effect of fiscal size on rent seeking.
6 Here, by using 
IV methods consistent with our model specification, we do find that larger government shares 
in GDP cause rent-seeking activities. In addition, single-equation regressions have not 
managed so far to establish a robust significant effect from electoral uncertainty to 
endogenous outcomes like rent seeking and growth.
7 Again, by examining the fiscal policy 
channel, we do provide such empirical evidence. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 
presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 closes the paper. Proofs and details on the data are 
gathered in the Appendix. 
 
2. THEORETICAL  MODEL 
 
2.1.  Informal description of the model  
Our aim is to add rent seeking and electoral uncertainty into a simple model of growth and 
fiscal policy. To do so, we combine the electoral uncertainty model of e.g. Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990), Devereux and Wen (1998) and Economides et al. (2003) with the rent-
seeking model of e.g. Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005). 
It is helpful to start by discussing the key features of the model. (i) We build upon the 
neoclassical growth model enriched with public goods financed by income taxes. (ii) To this 
model, we add a widely-used two-party political system. The political party that wins the 
election chooses economic policy during its term in office to maximize the welfare of the 
representative household knowing that the other party may win the next election with a non-
zero probability. (iii) Atomistic individuals can extract from government income (i.e. 
collected income tax revenue) to increase their own personal wealth. This is at the cost of 
social resources allocated to public goods. (iv) Rent-seeking behavior, on the part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
the effects of the size of public sector on economic growth, see the survey in Mueller (2003, chapter 22). 
Section 3.2 below will provide further details on the empirical literature.  
6 For instance, three recent papers in this literature have provided three different results. Treisman (2000) reports 
that measures of the size of government are not significantly related with corruption in a world sample; Fisman 
and Gatti (2002), using similar data with this paper in a sample that includes both developed and developing 
countries, report that the government share in GDP is reducing corruption; Glaeser and Saks (2006) find a weak 
positive relationship between bigger governments and corruption, using data for the USA states. Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) point out the potential problems of not addressing the endogeneity of government size.  
7 See e.g. Alesina et al. (1997) for the effects (or lack of them) of electoral uncertainty on growth, and Treisman 
(2000) for the effects (or lack of them) of political uncertainty on rent seeking.    4
individuals, is modeled as in e.g. Murphy et al. (1991). In other words, each individual is 
allowed to devote effort time to rent seeking by competing with other individuals for a 
fraction of collected tax revenue. Thus, each individual chooses optimally (in addition to 
consumption and saving) the allocation of its effort time between productive work and rent 
seeking activities. (v) In each time-period, the sequence of events is as follows: electoral 
uncertainty is resolved; in turn, economic policy is chosen by the party that wins the election; 
finally, private agents make their allocation choices simultaneously. We work with backward 
induction. (vi) We assume infinite-time horizons, discrete time and certainty (except from 
probabilistic electoral uncertainty). (vii) We solve for Markov policy strategies, and hence a 
Markov-perfect equilibrium, so that optimal policies are sub-game perfect and time 
consistent. 
  
2.2. Firms’  problem 
There is a constant number F  of identical firms indexed by the superscript  f  ∈  F . Each 
firm maximizes profits, 
f π , given by:  
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f
t t
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t l w k r y − − = π                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where 
f
t y , 
f
t k  and 
f
t l  are respectively output, capital input and labor input of firm  f  at time 
t; and  t r  and  t w  are the market interest rate and wage rate respectively. 
At the firm level, the production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form:  
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where  0 > A ,  1 0 < <α ,  1 0 < < ε  are parameters and 
F
G
g
t
t ≡  is average (per firm) 
government production services at t.
8 For a similar production function with CRS in the 
three factors, see e.g. Lansing (1998).  
                                                 
8 We could assume that the government also provides public consumption services that give direct utility to 
households; our results do not depend on this. Note that we use average public spending, rather than total, as an 
argument in (2) to avoid scale effects.   5
Each firm chooses 
f
t k  and 
f
t l  to maximize (1) subject to (2) by taking wages and 
interest rates, policy variables and aggregate outcomes as given. The solution of this static 
problem is standard and is presented in Appendix A.  
 
2.3. Households’  problem 
There is a constant number H  of identical households indexed by the superscript h ∈  H . 
Each household’s inter-temporal utility is: 
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where 
h
t c  is h’s consumption at time t and  1 0 < < β  is the discount rate. 
Each household h is endowed with one unit of effort time and then allocates 
1 0 ≤ <
h
t θ  of that unit to productive work and  1 ) 1 ( 0 < − ≤
h
t θ  to rent-seeking competition. 
The within-period budget constraint of each h is: 
 
t H
h
h
t
h
t h
t
h
t t
h
t t t
h
t
h
t E d w s r c s
∑
=
+
−
−
+ + + − = +
1
1
) 1 (
) 1 (
) )( 1 (
θ
θ
θ τ                                                              (4) 
 
where 
h
t s 1 +  is h’s end-of-period assets,  1 0 < < t τ  is the income tax rate common to all 
households, 
h
t d  is h’s share of dividends, and  t E  is the part of total tax revenue extracted by 
rent seekers in the economy (see below for the determination of  t E ). Thus, given a 
contestable pie,  t E , rent seekers compete for a fraction of that pie.
9 The initial stock, 
h s0 , is 
given.  
Each household h chooses { }
∞
= + 0 1, , t
h
t
h
t
h
t s c θ  to maximize (3) subject to (4) by taking 
prices, policy and aggregate outcomes, like ∑
=
−
H
h
h
t
1
) 1 ( θ , as given. The solution of this 
problem is in Appendix B.  
                                                 
9 For a similar rent seeking technology like in (4), see e.g. Murphy et al. (1991), Svensson (2000), Grossman 
and Mendoza (2003), Park et al. (2005) and Economides et al. (2007). For a survey of rent seeking models, see 
Mueller (2003, chapter 15).    6
2.4.  Government budget constraint   
The government runs a balanced budget by taxing households’ income at a rate  1 0 < < t τ . 
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where  t G  is spending on public production services and  t E  is the amount grabbed by rent 
seekers in the economy.
10  
If  1 ) 1 ( 0 ≤ − < b  denotes the fraction of collected tax revenue extracted by rent-
seekers, (5a) is equivalent to:
11 
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Given  1 0 ≤ < b , the path of the income tax rate { }
∞
=0 t t τ  summarizes economic policy.   
 
2.5. Competitive  decentralized  equilibrium   
Given tax rates 
∞
=0 } { t t τ , a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) is defined to be a 
sequence of allocations 
∞
= + 0 1 } , , , , , , { t t t
h
t
h
t
f
t
f
t
f
t E G s c l k θ  and prices 
∞
=0 } , { t t t w r  such that: (i) 
households maximize utility and firms maximize profits by taking prices, policy variables 
and aggregate outcomes as given; (ii) all budget constraints are satisfied; (iii) all markets 
                                                 
10 Fiscal favors to rent seekers can take a variety of forms. For instance, there can be direct transfers in cash (e.g. 
targeted subsidies and other benefits) and non-cash (e.g. private use of public assets and extra health services), 
as well as indirect transfers (e.g. measures that increase public sector’s demand for an interest group’s services). 
There are also measures that reduce tax burdens (e.g. tax exemptions and loopholes designed to favor special 
interests) coupled with a rise in the average tax rate to make up for the lost revenues. Obviously, this list is not 
exhaustive (see e.g. Mueller, 2003, chapter 15, for more examples). 
11 We will assume that b  is a parameter reflecting social norms; this is for algebraic simplicity. Alternatively, 
one could endogenize b . For instance, in equilibrium, b  could increase with aggregate per capita rent seeking 
activities (see e.g. Park et al., 2005, and the references therein). Our key results do not depend on this (see 
Appendix E for a version of our model with an endogenous b ).       7
clear.
12 We solve for a symmetric equilibrium in which households and firms are alike ex 
post, and the number of households, H , equals the number of firms, F . Appendix C shows:  
 
Result 1: In a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (given tax policy), private decisions are 
given by (quantities are in per capita terms):   
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Also, the two types of government spending, 
F
G
g
t
t ≡  and 
H
E
e
t
t ≡ , are: 
ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α τ θ τ + +
− −
+ + = t t t t t k b A b g
1 1
) (                                                                                          (6d) 
ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α τ θ τ + +
− −
+ + − = t t t t t k b A b e
1 1
) ( ) 1 (                                                                                    (6e) 
 
Equations (6a), (6b), (6c), (6d) and (6e) give  t c ,  1 + t k ,  t θ ,  t g  and  t e  as functions of 
the beginning-of-period capital stock,  t k , and the current value of the policy instrument,  t τ , 
only.
13 This simple structure will make the political parties’ optimisation problems recursive 
and hence optimal policies will be time consistent (see below).  
Equations (6a), (6b), (6d) and (6e) are standard (see e.g. McCallum (1989), Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1994, 1997), Devereux and Wen (1998) and Economides et al. (2003)), 
except that here we also have effects from incentives,  t θ . 
Equation (6c) gives the solution for  t θ  in a CDE, where recall that  t θ  denotes the 
fraction of effort time allocated to work relative to rent seeking. Notice that  0 <
∂
∂
t
t
τ
θ
 in (6c). 
That is, the fraction of effort time individuals allocate to work relative to rent seeking 
decreases with the tax rate,  t τ . This happens because atomistic agents do not internalize the 
                                                 
12 The market-clearing conditions are  ∑ ∑
= =
=
H
h
h
t
F
f
f
t l
1 1
θ ,  ∑ ∑
= =
=
H
h
h
t
F
f
f
t s k
1 1
 and  ∑ ∑
= =
=
H
h
h
t
F
f
f
t d
1 1
π . 
13 As is well known, this convenient solution is thanks to the functional forms used. Namely, full capital 
depreciation, logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas production functions. See e.g. Sargent (1987, chapter 
1).   8
adverse effect of their rent seeking actions on aggregate output and economic growth. Hence, 
whenever the tax rate,  t τ , increases, they get the impression that the contestable prize, 
∑ − = t t t y b E τ ) 1 ( , also increases and so attempt to extract a greater share of it by devoting 
less time to work and more time to rent seeking. This is as in Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), 
Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005). Then, if we solve for  t θ , (6a) and (6b) give the paths of 
capital and consumption.  
Also notice three things in (6a-c). First,  0
) / ( 1 >
∂
∂ +
t
t t k k
θ
, which means that gross capital 
accumulation, 
t
t
k
k 1 + , increases with the fraction of time individuals allocate to work relative to 
rent seeking. Second, the effect of the tax rate,  t τ , on gross capital accumulation, is given by 
(?) ( ) ( )
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∂∂∂ ∂
. Thus, in addition to the standard direct Laffer-curve-type effect, 
there is an additional indirect effect through the distortion of incentives. The total effect is not 
monotonic; a sufficient condition for this to be negative,  0
) / ( 1 <
∂
∂ +
t
t t k k
τ
, is  ε α τ − − >1 t , 
which guarantees that the direct Laffer curve effect is also negative. Third, the effects of rent 
seeking activities and the tax rate on gross economic growth, 
t
t
y
y 1 + , are qualitatively the same 
as those of 
t
t
k
k 1 + . Hence, we will use the last two terms interchangeably.  
We can now endogenize policy, as summarized by the income tax rate, 
∞
=0 } { t t τ .  
 
2.6.  Policy and general equilibrium with exogenous re-election probabilities 
To endogenize economic policy, we form a non-cooperative game between two identical 
political parties, denoted by i and  j . Following most of the relevant literature, we start by 
assuming that the two parties alternate in power according to an exogenous and constant re-
election probability (endogenous probabilities are studied below). Specifically, if elections 
take place in each time-period t, the incumbent party has an exogenous and constant 
probability  1 0 ≤ ≤ q  of winning the next election and remaining in power at  1 + t , and a 
probability  1 1 0 ≤ − ≤ q  of losing the election and being out of power at  1 + t . Thus, the   9
transition equation is a two-state Markov process, where the parameter q can be interpreted 
as the voter bias in favor of the incumbent government, no matter what type.   
  As is shown below, exogenous re-election probabilities, together with the assumed 
functional forms (logarithmic preferences, Cobb-Douglas production function and full capital 
depreciation), enable us to get an exact analytical solution for the optimally chosen tax rate. 
Also, this optimally chosen tax rate will be state-independent. Hence, the popularity of this 
setup in the literature (see e.g. Devereux and Wen (1998) and Economides et al. (2003) in the 
political business cycle literature, as well as Barro (1990) in a popular single-government 
endogenous growth model).    
A general equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) The currently elected party i chooses 
t τ  to maximize the utility of the representative household in (3) subject to the CDE in (6a)-
(6e), and by taking as given the policy of the other party,  i j ≠ , which may be in power at 
1 + t . That is, the in-power party plays Nash vis-a-vis the out-of-power party. The out-of-
power party takes no action until it wins an election. (ii) We solve for Markov policy 
strategies, i.e.  t τ  can be function of the current state of the game only. (iii) We solve for a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium in Markov policy strategies, i.e. parties’ policies will be 
symmetric ex post. Thus, there are no partisan effects. (iv) We assume that political parties do 
not care about the economy when out of power.
14 (v) The solution for  t τ , and the associated 
level of government spending, in combination with the CDE, will give a (Markov-perfect) 
general equilibrium. 
From the parties’ viewpoint, the state at t is summarized by the inherited capital stock 
t k . Let  ) ( t
P k V
i  and  ) ( t
N k V
i denote the value functions of party i at time t, when in 
power and when out of power respectively. These value functions should satisfy the 
following pair of Bellman equations (party  j ’s problem is symmetric):
15 
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14 This is for simplicity. Our results do not change as long as we assume that parties care less about the economy 
when out of power than when in power. See Economides et al. (2003) for details.  
15 This modelling is as in e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and Wen (1998) 
and Economides et al. (2003).    10
where  t c  and  1 + t k  follow (6a) and (6b) respectively. It is straightforward to show that this 
problem gives (see Appendix D):   
 
Result 2: In a Markov-perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between two 
political parties, the income tax rate, τ , is constant over time and is a solution to:   
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(8)  
 
Equation (8) is an equation in the tax rate, τ , only. In turn, as said above, the solution for τ , 
in combination with the DCE in (6a)-(6e), gives a general equilibrium. 
  The key thing is the effect of electoral uncertainty (q) on the tax rate (τ ) and 
incentives (θ ). Since equation (8) is non-linear and cannot be solved analytically, we solve it 
numerically by using commonly used parameter values (we report that our results are robust 
to the parameter values chosen). For instance, we start by setting  4 . 0 = α ,  5 . 0 = ε ,  9 . 0 = β , 
5 . 0 = b ,  3 = A  and  5 . 0 = q , where the assumed value of q reflects the assumption that the 
two parties face the same degree of electoral uncertainty.
16 In this case, equation (8) gives 
104 . 0 = τ  and, in turn, equation (6c) gives  895 . 0 = θ  (namely, agents allocate 89.5% of their 
effort time to legal activities, while the rest is allocated to rent seeking).  
Using these parameter values, comparative statics for varying values of q imply 
0 <
∂
∂
q
τ
 and  0 >
∂
∂
q
θ
 (see Appendix D for details). In other words, as electoral uncertainty 
increases (i.e. as q falls), the party in power finds it optimal to go for a larger public sector, 
where the latter requires a higher income tax rate (τ ),
17 and atomistic individuals find it 
                                                 
16 The values of α  and ε  (the productivity of capital and labor in private production) are close to the values 
used in the RBC literature. The value of  β  (time preference rate) is close to the one used by most studies. The 
value of b  (the share of collected tax revenues which is not grabbed by rent-seekers) is set equal to  5 . 0 . The 
value of  A  (aggregate productivity) is set equal to 3 (A  works as a scale effect only, so that its value does not 
affect the key variables). 
17 Addition of public debt would probably lead the party in power to finance a larger public sector today by 
borrowing rather than raising taxes (see e.g. Lockwood et al., 1996). This would not change our qualitative 
predictions. Larger public sector and accumulation of public debt will necessitate higher tax rates sooner or 
later. The anticipation of higher taxes in the future will exert an adverse effect on growth in the present. In other 
words, when facing a lower probability of getting re-elected, the party in power would choose to tax future 
generations relatively more in exactly the same (shortsighted) manner as suggested by higher spending/taxes in 
the present setup; in all cases, shortsighted policies hurt growth.     11
optimal to allocate less effort to productive work and more effort to rent seeking (i.e. θ  falls). 
Combining these effects, equation (6b), together with (6c) and (8), imply 
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. Thus, a lower re-election probability (i.e. a lower q) 
leads to lower capital accumulation and economic growth.  
The mechanism that drives the above results is as follows. When there is electoral 
uncertainty, and the political parties care less about economic outcomes when out of power 
than when in power, the party in power cares effectively less about the future. The smaller the 
probability of re-election, the less the party in office internalizes the future costs of 
overspending\overtaxing today. This is translated into shortsighted policies, here in the form 
of a relatively large public sector. Hence, increased electoral uncertainty induces more short-
sighted fiscal policies that reduce private investment and eventually hurt growth. This is a 
standard result in the political business cycle literature (see Persson and Tabellini (1999, 
section 7.2) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 14.2) for details and review of the 
related literature).
18 
19 What is novel here is that these relatively large public sectors have an 
additional detrimental effect on private incentives by signaling a larger pie and thus pushing 
individuals away from productive work to rent-seeking competition for a share of extra fiscal 
favors. Then, these distorted incentives further hurt growth. In other words, in addition to a 
direct standard Laffer-curve-type effect, a larger public sector due to elections has an indirect 
adverse effect on growth via the deterioration of private incentives. This is the scenario we 
test empirically.  
 
2.7.  Policy and general equilibrium with endogenous re-election probabilities  
We now study the more general case in which the re-election probability is endogenous. This 
reflects the idea that the incumbent’s chances of remaining in power depend on the 
performance of the economy before elections. Equivalently, as e.g. Persson and Tabellini 
(1999, p. 1454) point out, “governments also manipulate state variables to increase their 
                                                 
18 Equivalently, when the probability of losing the next election increases, and the incumbent party has no 
interest in household consumption when out of office, then the value of expected future consumption falls in the 
party’s value function, and this in turn leads the incumbent to make policy choices that favor the present more 
relative to the future. In our context, this implies a larger than (socially) optimal government size and taxes 
today as well as lower growth rates.  
19 Note that shortsightedness takes different forms in different models. As said, here takes the form of excessive 
size of the public sector (relative to the case of a single-party government). But it can also take the form of 
leaving smaller assets to successor governments (see Devereux and Wen, 1998), delaying improvements in the 
legal system (see Svensson, 1998), weakening the protection of property rights (see Alesina et al., 1996), a 
preference for public consumption over public investment (see Malley et al, 2007), etc.       12
chances of re-election”. Here, we assume that the re-election probability,  1 + t q , follows the 
state-dependent rule: 
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where  1 0 0 < < q  is a constant,  1 0 < < q ρ  is an autoregressive parameter, 
t
t
t k
k
i
1 + ≡  is gross 
current capital accumulation (see equation (6b)), i is the model-consistent long-run value of 
t i  (for any variable  t x ,  x denotes its long-run value), and  0 ≥ γ  is a feedback parameter that 
measures the effect of the current growth rate on the re-election probability. 
W e  w i s h  t o  m a k e  s o m e  c o m m e n t s  o n  o u r  modeling in (9). First, the re-election 
probability consists of two components: one component relates the current growth 
performance under the incumbent, while the other reflects exogenous characteristics of the 
incumbent. Second, there are obviously many intuitive state variables that can affect the re-
election probability. Since all of them are equally ad hoc and their choice is eventually an 
empirical matter, here we prefer to follow Malley et al. (2007) by choosing  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
i
it . As we 
show below, this choice gives intuitive results. It is also reasonable in the sense that private 
investment is the main determinant of economic growth in our model economy.
20 Third, if 
0 = γ  and  0 = q ρ , equation (9) simplifies to the popular model of the literature where the re-
election probability is a parameter,  0 1 q qt = +  (see subsection 2.6 above). Fourth, it has the 
desired long-run property,  0 q q = .  
While the definition of a general equilibrium remains as above in subsection 2.6, the 
state variables at t - from the political parties’ viewpoint - now include the inherited capital 
stock,  t k , and the current value of the re-election probability,  t q . Let  ) , ( t t
P q k V
i  and 
) , ( t t
N q k V
i  denote the new value functions of party i at time t when in power and when out 
of power respectively. These value functions should satisfy the following pair of Bellman 
equations (party  j ’s problem is symmetric): 
                                                 
20 See Malley et al. (2007), and in particular the discussion below their equation (14), for a justification of an 
equation like (9). Actually, our modeling and solution methodology in this subsection are very close to theirs. 
On the other hand, Malley et al. do not study rent seeking; they focus on the allocation of tax revenue between 
productive and non-productive government spending, and how it is affected by elections.     13
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where  t c ,  1 + t k  and  1 + t q  follow equations (6a), (6b) and (9) respectively.  
As is shown below, a non-constant re-election probability in (9) implies that exact 
analytical solutions for the optimal tax rate and the value functions in (10a)-(10b) cannot be 
obtained. Nevertheless, we get a first-order approximate analytical solution where the 
approximation is around the model’s long-run solution. We define the long run to be a 
situation in which variables do not change (for any variable  t x ,  x denotes its long-run value), 
which also implies that the re-election probability in (9) is constant,  0 q q =  (for instance, we 
choose to set  5 . 0 0 ≡ = q q ). This solution methodology follows Campbell and Viceira (2002, 
chapter 5.1) who also provide references, while the closest model to ours is Malley et al. 
(2007). Appendix E shows:  
 
Result 3. Under endogenous re-election probabilities as in (9), in a Markov-perfect general 
equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between two political parties, the income tax rate,  t τ , 
is state-contingent and is approximately given by:  
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 3 2 1 = Ω + Ω + Ω t t q t k q ρ τ                                                                                                     (11) 
where for any variable  t x,   ) ln( ˆ
x
x
x
x x
x
t t
t ≅
−
≡ ,  x is the model-consistent long-run value of 
t x , and  1 Ω ,  2 Ω  and  3 Ω  are evaluated in the long run and are defined in Appendix F. 
 
Therefore, equation (11), jointly with the CDE in equations (6a)-(6e), give an 
approximate general equilibrium in which economic policy is optimally chosen by two 
political parties that alternate in power according to an endogenous re-election probability as 
in (9). Notice that equation (11) implies 
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. Since  1 Ω ,  2 Ω  and 
3 Ω  are non-linear expressions we use the same parameter values as above in subsection 2.6 
in order to compute them numerically.    14
Appendix F shows that, with the same parameter values,  0
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. In other words, the key result of subsection 2.6 remains unchanged: namely, 
higher political uncertainty pushes parties to short-sighted policies, which in turn trigger rent-
seeking activities and hurt capital accumulation and economic growth.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE   
 
In this section we will test the predictions of the stylized model presented above by using data 
for 25 OECD countries in three 5-year periods, over 1982-1996.  
 
3.1. Empirical  specification   
We will consider an econometric model of the following form
21:   
 
 variables control   y  uncertaint   electoral   *       government   of   size 1 + =λ                                      (12a) 
 variables control     government   of   size   *       seeking rent  2 + =λ                                                  (12b) 
 variables control     seeking rent    *       government   of   size   *       rate growth  4 3 + + = λ λ                     (12c) 
 
Following the model predictions and the discussion above, the effect of electoral 
uncertainty on the size of government in (12a) should be positive. Then, in (12b), the effect 
of the size of government on rent seeking behavior should be positive. Finally, in (12c), the 
effect of rent seeking behavior on growth should be negative, while the effect of the size of 
government on growth can be either positive or negative.
22 We have also added a number of 
auxiliary variables (called control variables) to take account of effects not included in our 
stylized model but usually included in such regressions in empirical work (see below for 
details). These additional control variables will be useful for instrumenting the endogenous 
right hand side variables in equations (12b) and (12c). 
                                                 
21 This specification is based on the basic model with exogenous re-election probabilities (subsection 2.6).  As 
shown above, although extensions of the basic framework can give richer results, the main predictions do not 
change.    
22 According to the theoretical model, the effects of rent seeking and size of the government on the capital 
accumulation and economic growth are qualitatively the same. In the empirical part, we focus on the growth rate 
so that our specification is closer to the empirical growth literature, but we will also examine investment as an 
endogenous variable.    15
The model in (12a)-(12c) is a recursive system. The recursive structure follows from 
the sequence of events in the theoretical model; specifically, the elected government chooses 
policy by acting as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis private agents.
23 Since there may be 
common shocks that affect simultaneously the endogenous variables, so that the error terms 
across equations are correlated, OLS estimates of (12b) and (12c) can be biased. Hence, we 
need valid instruments for the endogenous right hand side variables in (12b) and (12c) in 
order to apply IV methods (but we also examine standard Least Squares results). As such 
instruments, we use the exogenous variables appearing in the system. We will test the validity 
and the relevance of these instruments.  
Concerning the data, we would like to make the following general points (further 
details will be given later).  
First, rent-seeking or other extractive activities are hard to measure. Hence, any 
empirical methodology can only utilize proxy variables, which can hopefully provide 
adequate description of this type of activities (note that rent seeking from the government 
budget is an expression of non-productive or extractive incentives, since, as also implied by 
the theoretical model, when economic agents extract from the tax revenue, they essentially 
extract from the aggregate, economy-wide income). A widely used (see e.g. the papers 
reviewed below) proxy of weak institutions is the ICRG index, which is obtained by using the 
IRIS dataset constructed by Knack and Keefer (1995). This index is essentially a measure of 
outcomes that result from the permanent “deep parameters” underlying exogenous 
institutional features. If institutions are weak, so that there is low quality of governance, high 
corruption and low protection of property rights (which is what the ICRG index measures), 
we expect extraction activities to thrive and, in particular, rent seeking from the government 
budget to be widespread. Hence, in the absence of a direct measure of rent seeking, we 
believe that the ICRG index is a relevant proxy. 
Extraction activities can take a variety of forms and, naturally, different authors have 
used this dataset to obtain proxies for similar activities that in general involve a misallocation 
                                                 
23 Obviously, by relaxing the Stackelberg leader assumption, or by making different behavioural assumptions 
for the government (allowing e.g. for corrupt bureaucracies or extractive ruling elites) we could allow for weak 
institutions, and rent seeking in particular, to affect the size of government. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
present evidence that weak institutions (measured as constraints on the executive) result in higher government 
consumption spending in a world sample. Here we focus on the effect of the size of the government on rent 
extraction activities, and by allowing for the size of the government to be endogenous in this regression, we 
control for potential simultaneity bias.   16
of resources from productive to extractive activities.
24 Such activities are highly related and, 
in practice, the available empirical proxies tend to be highly correlated (see e.g. Treisman, 
2000, p. 411, Acemoglu et al. 2001, p. 1370, 2003, p. 68 and Persson et al. 2003, p. 967). 
Probably the most appropriate way to describe these empirical measures is as a proxy of a 
“cluster of social arrangements” (using the expression from Acemoglu and co-authors, see 
their papers referred to here) that encompasses the set of incentives economic agents face to 
engage in productive versus socially harmful, non-productive activities. As these activities 
are endogenous outcomes (recall also that in the theoretical model the private agents in the 
economy optimally choose rent-seeking activities, so that rent seeking is an endogenous, 
choice variable), we explicitly treat the ICRG proxy as an endogenous variable.  
A second issue is how to approximate uncertainty about remaining in power. We use 
two measures. First, we proxy electoral uncertainty by using pre-election dummies, as it has 
been common practice in the political business cycles literature (see e.g. Alesina et al., 1997). 
The idea is that the more elections are held in a given time interval (the 5-year period), the 
higher is the uncertainty that policy makers are facing in this period (this is as in Fatas and 
Mihov, 2003, and similar to Treisman, 2000). In addition, we use a more general measure of 
the stability of the governments, obtained from Beck et al. (2000), which captures the extent 
of turnover of a government’s decision makers, as the percentage of the main veto gates 
(legislature, executive) in a system that have changed hands in any year. This is a useful 
alternative to the number of elections for the uncertainty about remaining in power, as, for 
instance, governments might be more uncertain about remaining in power when a party 
leaves the government coalition or if they lose control over the legislature.  
Third, real long-term time series observations are not available for rent seeking and 
electoral uncertainty, and thus the analysis can only be confined to the medium-term impact 
of these variables on growth. We use 5-year periods, so that growth regressions make sense 
(this is not uncommon in the empirical literature that examines the relation between fiscal 
policy and economic growth). A concern with using a relatively short-time period, such as a 
5-year period, when evaluating the growth effects of fiscal policy, is the potential 
endogeneity of fiscal policy, as there is the risk of short-term covariation such as business 
cycles correlations (for instance, counter-cyclical fiscal policy). However, we deal with this 
problem by using instrumental variable regressions.  
                                                 
24 For instance, Knack and Keefer (1995) proxy “institutions”, Barro (1997) uses the term “rule of law”, Hall 
and Jones (1999) “social infrastructure”, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) “extractive institutions”, Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) and Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) “corruption”.   17
3. 2.  Comparison with the empirical literature  
Equations (12a)-(12c) give a structural model that studies the joint determination of the above 
three endogenous variables (size of government, rent seeking behaviour, and economic 
growth) when the driving force is uncertainty about remaining in power. As said above, the 
contribution of our paper is that we identify a channel through which electoral uncertainty 
affects the joint determination of these three key variables.
25 This differs from the empirical 
studies that have concentrated on reduced-form relations to uncover the determinants of these 
variables.  
There is a vast empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth (see e.g. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 12) and the papers cited there). Focusing on the 
growth effects of extraction and anti-social activities, Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer 
(1995), Barro (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001,2002), 
have, among many others, provided evidence that entrenched corruption and poor institutions 
are a significant impediment to growth. Concerning the growth effects of government 
spending, there is some general indication that the overall size of the public sector is 
negatively associated with economic growth; however, this negative association is 
statistically fragile and sensitive to model specification (see Mueller, 2003, chapter 22, for a 
review of this literature). There is also evidence (see e.g. Alesina et al, 1996 and Drazen, 
2000, chapter 11.6, for a review) that measures of socio-political stability are associated with 
higher growth in world samples. However, when Alesina et al (1997) investigate the effect of 
electoral competition on economic outcomes, electoral uncertainty is not found to have a 
significant direct impact on growth in reduced-form regressions for the OECD countries.  
Concerning the determinants of rent seeking, the most extensive study is probably 
Treisman’s (2000) work on the variables explaining the CPI index of perceptions of 
corruption.
26 In his cross-national study, Treisman reports a negative, albeit not significant, 
effect of various measures of government intervention and policy on the CPI index. Fisman 
                                                 
25 Methodologically, therefore, our empirical analysis belongs to the literature of estimating structural models 
behind the reduced form for these three key endogenous variables. Related examples in this approach include 
e.g. papers by Perotti (1996), Fatas and Mihov (2003) and Easterly et al. (2006). Perotti employs a recursive 
system to estimate the effect of income inequality on the growth rate, via some potential channels (one of which 
is endogenous fiscal policy). Fatas and Mihov present evidence that political factors (the electoral cycle being 
one of them) affect the volatility (discretion) of fiscal policy, and this is associated with higher output volatility, 
which is bad for the growth rate. Easterly et al. present evidence that measures of social cohesion affect 
institutional quality and this, in turn, determines growth. 
26 The CPI index, developed by Transparency International, focuses on the extent of corruption in government. 
As we discuss below, we prefer to use instead the ICRG index as a measure of rent seeking activities, because it 
has a sufficiently long-time series dimension and is a more general measure of rent seeking than bureaucratic 
corruption. It should be noted, however, that the CPI and the ICRG indices are highly correlated (see Treisman 
(2000, p. 411) and Persson et al. (2003, p. 967)).   18
and Gatti (2002), on the other hand, report a significant effect of the government share in 
GDP in reducing corruption.  Glaeser and Saks (2006) find a weak positive relationship 
between bigger governments and corruption, using data for the USA states (a positive 
relationship between bigger governments and corruption for the USA states is also reported 
in Goel and Nelson, 1998). Treisman (2000) also reports that political uncertainty, as 
measured by the average number of leaders the country had per year in the preceding period 
(see p. 414 on how this period is defined), is not significantly associated with (perceived) 
corruption in any of his regressions. However, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) have 
recently documented a link between electoral rules and corruption. 
Finally, concerning the effects of elections on fiscal policy, Alesina et al. (1997, 
chapter 7) provide evidence that government spending increases in pre-electoral periods 
(Drazen (2000, chapter 7) and Mueller (2003, chapter 19) survey the literature). A more 
general study of the empirical determinants of the size of public sector can be found in 
Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3), who discuss estimates of the effects of several 
intuitive variables on different measures of the size of government (although political 
uncertainty is not included as a possible explanatory variable). 
In summarizing the empirical evidence so far, it is probably fair to say that the 
empirical literature has not been able to establish a robust direct effect of electoral uncertainty 
on economic outcomes such as rent seeking and economic growth, in reduced-form 
regressions of (12b) and (12c). This literature has, however, already established a significant 
positive effect of electoral uncertainty on the size of the government in equations of the form 
of (12a). In addition, regarding (12c), a significant negative effect of measures of extraction 
activities on economic growth has been obtained in a number of studies. In any case, it seems 
that the weakest link in our proposed channel for the effect of electoral uncertainty is the 
effect of the size of the government on rent seeking in equation (12b), as mixed results have 
been obtained in the literature. As Glaeser and Saks (2006, p.1065) point out, endogeneity 
problems have to be dealt with in this type of regression, an issue we pay particular attention 
to.   
 
3.3. Data 
We have collected data for 25 OECD countries, over the years 1982-1996 (the time period is 
determined by the availability of the Knack and Keefer, 1995, commonly used ICRG index), 
so that we can have three 5-year periods/observations for each country. Details on the data 
used can be found in Appendix G. Here we present the basic points.   19
To measure electoral uncertainty, we construct a pre-election dummy and then take 
the average of this pre-election dummy over the five-year period, denoting the resulting 
variable as elections.
27 A larger value means more elections in these five years, so that 
incumbent parties face a larger probability of losing power on average. In addition, we use a 
proxy for the stability of the governments from the Beck et al. (2000) database (this is 
denoted as instability, and is again the average over the five-year periods). A larger value in 
instability means that more key decision makers dropped from the government, so that the 
stability of the government is reduced and hence the uncertainty about remaining in power is 
increased. 
  To obtain a measure of extraction activities, as said above, we use the ICRG index 
from the IRIS dataset. This dataset has been used in a series of papers (see, among many 
others, Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Persson et al. (2003)). Although 
there exist other datasets that can also provide a measure of rent extraction activities (like e.g. 
the CPI index explained above), the ICRG index is the only panel dataset on rent seeking and 
has a sufficiently long-time series dimension (1982-1997) which makes it suitable for our 
purposes. By taking advantage of its time series dimension, we get three 5-year averages of 
this index (this variable is appropriately defined so that higher values indicate more rent 
seeking; see Appendix G for details). 
The Penn World Tables (PWT), version 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002), provide us with the 
real GDP per capita in constant prices, which is then used to obtain the five-year average of 
annual growth rates (denoted as growth rate), as well as the government consumption share 
in GDP in constant prices, which is also averaged over the 5-year period to give us the 
variable denoted govshare, which will be used as our primary measure of fiscal size.
28 
The set of control variables used is based on previous studies (see the papers referred 
to earlier). In particular, in the growth regression we first include the log of the initial level of 
                                                 
27 Fatas and Mihov (2003) also use the average number of elections (over a 25 year period, 1975-2000) in order 
to control for the effect of electoral cycles in the shaping of fiscal policy in a cross-section of countries. As 
discussed above, Treisman (2000) uses a similar proxy for political uncertainty as well, by constructing a 
measure of the average number of government leaders per year in the recent period.  
28 This is the general government consumption component of GDP. It does not include public investment, 
interest payments, subsidies and other transfers. Note however that a large part of government spending on 
goods and services, included in govshare, has investment features and/or complements private resources in the 
production process (e.g. salaries of teachers, professors and doctors and spending on police or the judiciary 
system). The PWT measure has been used e.g. Barro (1997), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Fisman and Gatti 
(2002), Hall and Jones (1998) and Rodrick (1998), among many others. See the Appendix G for more details 
and the discussion below on results by using alternative measures of fiscal spending from the OECD Economic 
Outlook and the World Development Indicators (WDI) datasets.  
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GDP in each country (the 1981 observation), which is denoted as lgdp and is obtained from 
the Penn World Tables, to control for convergence effects. Potential growth promoting 
factors considered include human capital, which is measured by the average years of 
education (denoted as education), the degree of a country’s openness to trade, for which we 
use the Penn World Tables measure (denoted here as openness) and the investment share in 
GDP (denoted as investment), which is again obtained from the Penn World Tables. As 
potential determinants of rent seeking, we use lgdp, education, openness and a measure of the 
degree of political freedom – or of the quality of democracy – by using the Gastil Index (so 
that we denote this variable gastil). We expect all these variables to be inversely related to 
rent seeking. Finally, as control variables in the fiscal policy regression, we use: lgdp, as 
Wagner’s law suggests that richer countries should have bigger public sectors; openness, 
following Rodrik’s (1998) proposition that more open economies may prefer larger public 
sectors as an insurance against terms of trade risk; the age dependency ratio (denoted as 
agedep), as demographic evolutions may put pressure on the public budget; and the area of 
the country (denoted as surface), as there may be more scope for government intervention, in 
the form of addressing externalities and providing public goods, in bigger countries. More 
details on the justification for including the above variables in these regressions can be found 
in the papers reviewed in the previous subsection; more information on the data is given in 
Appendix G. 
 
3.4.  Basic results  
The basic results are presented in Table 1 below. The first two columns present Least Squares 
estimates of the size of government equation, using the two measures of uncertainty about 
remaining in power. We report standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and arbitrary intra-country serial correlation. We see that the political uncertainty variables 
are both significant, thus supporting the proposition that shorter time horizons from the point 
of view of the policymakers result into more government spending. Note that higher values of 
both elections and instability imply an increase in the uncertainty about remaining in power. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Regarding the control variables, the most significant effect is that of openness, which 
seems to verify Rodrik’s (1998) proposition for the OECD. On the other hand, richer 
countries do not have larger public sectors, as Wagner’s law suggests. The two remaining   21
controls, surface and agedep have the expected signs and surface is significant as well.
 29 
Regarding surface, we report that we have also used the (log of) population of the countries 
as a measure of their size, as Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) suggest that in countries with 
more population, one would expect a smaller government share in GDP, because the cost of 
public goods can be spread over a larger pool of taxpayers (i.e. there are increasing returns in 
the provision of public goods). This has the expected negative sign in our regressions, but it is 
insignificant, without affecting the aforementioned results. Similar results regarding 
population have been obtained in Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3). The significant 
positive effect of surface in our regressions is consistent with the negative effect of 
population density that Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) report. In these regressions we also 
include time dummies (denoted as D(87-91) and D(92-96). These time dummies are negative 
and highly significant, which is consistent with a common trend in recent years in the OECD 
countries towards lower public spending.   
   We then move on to estimating the effect of govshare on rent seeking activities, as the 
latter are measured by the ICRG index. Given the potential endogeneity of govshare in this 
regression, we will use the variables in the previous equation (for govshare) as well as the 
exogenous determinants of ICRG as instruments for govshare in GMM procedures.
30 Thus, 
the additional instruments, used to identify govshare are elections, agedep, surface, D(87-91) 
and D(92-96) in column 3 and instability, agedep, surface, D(87-91) and D(92-96) in column 
4. We treat the time dummies as instruments since we have found that they are not significant 
in explaining ICRG – they are, however, highly significant in the govshare regression (see 
also below on this). As can be seen, a higher value of govshare is significant in increasing 
ICRG, which is consistent with an aggravation of rent extraction activities, as the theoretical 
model predicts.  
It is also worth noting that all the control variables are significant in this regression, 
with the expected signs. Richer and more open countries, more political freedom and an 
educated population all result in a decrease in ICRG (less rent seeking). With the exception of 
gastil, these results for the control variables have also been obtained in the literature, in 
different samples and specifications, although we are not aware of a study where these 
variables have all been significant in the same specification. The effect of initial income is 
                                                 
29 Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3), in a world sample for the nineties, find significant demographic 
effects on total government expenditure (that includes social security). In our specification for the OECD, 
demographic effects do not seem to be robustly related with the government share in GDP. 
30 The GMM estimator used here is optimal under arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country serial 
correlation. We have also estimated the regressions with endogenous right hand side variables with 2SLS. As 
the results are similar, we do not present 2SLS results to save on space.   22
probably the more robust finding. For instance, Treisman (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), 
Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) all find that initial 
income reduces rent extraction activities. Positive effects of openness on decreasing 
extraction activities are obtained in e.g. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Treisman (2000). 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) find strong evidence for the effect of education in reducing 
corruption. Perhaps the more interesting result here is the effect of political freedom, as the 
above studies have not been able to document a robust effect. In our sample, this effect is 
clearly significant.    
  A fundamental concern with IV regression methods is whether the instruments are 
valid and relevant. We try to address these issues. We start with validity, by implementing 
standard over-identifying restrictions tests. The Hansen statistic gives a p-value of 0.353 in 
column 3 and 0.555 in column 4, which is clearly consistent with the null that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term. Of particular interest may be testing whether the time 
dummies are correctly excluded from the regression and hence whether they are indeed valid 
instruments. Therefore, we also report a C test for the orthogonality of the time dummies. The 
p-value supports the use of the time dummies as instruments. Hence, we can have some 
confidence that our instruments are valid.
31 
  Next, we want to see whether the instruments are relevant. Recent research has shown 
that there can be severe problems with IV estimation and testing procedures, if the 
instruments are only weakly related with the endogenous variable (see e.g. Dufour, 2003 and 
Andrews and Stock, 2005, for reviews). A weak instruments problem is usually suspected by 
a small F-statistic of the test that the joint effect of the excluded instruments on the 
endogenous variable is zero in the first stage regression (or, equivalently, by a low 
partial
2 R ). In our case, the first stage F-statistics are high, much higher than 10, which is the 
value proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) as a rule of thumb “critical” value for identifying 
potential weak instrument problems when there is one endogenous regressor.  
  In any case, to make sure that the effect of govshare on ICRG is not affected by the 
relevance of our instruments, we also examine tests for the significance of the parameter 
estimate of govshare that are robust to weak instruments. We focus on the Anderson and 
Rubin (1949) (AR) test, as this can be extended to allowing for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error term (see e.g. Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2006)). The AR test is in 
                                                 
31 The tests reported are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country serial correlation. 
Many of the tests and estimators in this paper have been implemented using the routines written by Baum, 
Schaffer and Stillman (2006). We are particularly grateful to Mark Schaffer for his help.   23
addition robust to a number of misspecifications (in particular, to the specification of the 
relationship for the endogenous variable and to excluded instruments, see Dufour, 2003 and 
Dufour and Taamouti, 2006, for more details). The test statistics in Table 1 easily reject the 
null of a zero effect of govshare on ICRG. 
Finally, we turn to the growth regression. In columns 5 and 6 we present GMM 
results when ICRG and govshare are treated as endogenous variables and the instruments 
used to identify them are elections, uncertainty, agedep, surface and gastil (column 5) or 
instability, uncertainty, agedep, surface and gastil (column 6).
32 The results with respect to 
the endogenous variables are in accordance with both the predictions of the theory and 
previous empirical findings. In particular, ICRG is found to be negative and significant, while 
govshare is not significant. The first result is consistent with the hypothesis that rent seeking 
is bad for growth, while the second could imply that OECD countries are around the optimal 
size with respect to the size of the government share in GDP. With respect to the control 
variables, we see that lgdp is significantly negative, which is consistent with conditional 
convergence, while openness and education are not significant (we carefully deal with the 
case of investment in subsection 3.6 below). A number of studies (see subsection 3.2 above) 
have found a positive effect of these last two variables on economic growth. A potential 
explanation for their insignificance here can be that they are both highly related to decreases 
in ICRG, so that when they are used as instruments for ICRG, a large part of their positive 
impact on growth is already controlled for.
33 
A Hansen over-identification test cannot reject the null that the instruments are not 
correlated with the error in the second stage regression (such tests do reject the null when the 
time dummies are used as instruments, and so does the C orthogonality test for the dummies). 
However, the first stage F-statistics are relatively low, especially for govshare. Therefore, we 
also test the null that the joint effect of ICRG and govshare in the structural equation is zero, 
                                                 
32 For instance, the assumption behind using gastil as an instrument for govshare and ICRG in the growth 
regression is that (at least in the OECD countries) political freedom does not affect economic growth other than 
through the size of government and the incentives that it creates for economic agents to engage in extractive 
activities. The same argument applies for the other instrumental variables. We assess statistically this 
assumption by means of overidentification tests in our regressions. 
33 Barro (1997) proposes a similar argument to explain the insignificance of levels of schooling in the female 
population in growth regressions in world samples. In particular, he suggests that female schooling may be 
important to growth indirectly, via improving other growth promoting factors, such as health indicators (e.g. 
infant mortality ratios). Barro finds that in world samples only years of secondary and higher education of the 
male population have a direct effect on growth, because, he argues, they are a better proxy for human capital. 
We report that, in our specification, years of secondary and higher schooling, for the male or total population, 
are not significant in the growth regression.   24
by using the Anderson-Rubin test. This clearly rejects the null, indicating that these two 
variables are jointly significant in explaining growth. 
  
3.5. Discussion 
The results in the previous section support the proposed transmission mechanism for the 
effect of electoral uncertainty on the macro economy. As already said, a crucial link for this 
mechanism is the effect of fiscal spending on rent extraction activities, because there is mixed 
evidence in the literature regarding this. A difference in our study, compared to the papers 
reviewed above, is that we focus on the OECD countries. However, it is also important that 
we treat our fiscal size variable (govshare) as an endogenous variable. Table 2 presents Least 
Squares estimates of (9b) and (9c) to illustrate why this is important. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
As can be seen in this Table, in column 1, govshare is still positive in OLS 
regressions in the OECD, however the estimated coefficient is much smaller than the GMM 
estimates. This suggests that there are important downward biases in the Least Squares 
estimates. In other words, shocks that decrease the ICRG  index (i.e. reduce extraction 
activities) may also increase govshare. For instance, the implementation of an institutional 
change, designed to decrease rent seeking, like, e.g. an increase in checks for government 
policies to examine whether they favor particular lobbies, may require higher government 
expenditure to finance it.  
It is also interesting to see what a Least Squares regression of the growth equation 
gives. Estimates from such a regression are given in column 4 in Table 2. As can be seen, 
ICRG is still significant, but the estimated coefficient is much smaller (in absolute value) 
compared to the GMM estimates. This could happen if positive income shocks (i.e. positive 
productivity shocks) are also increasing rent-seeking effort, if rent seekers perceive them as 
an increase in the contestable prize (for instance, the discovery of a new natural resource). In 
this case, the “true” effect of ICRG on growth may be larger than the Least Squares estimate.       
It may be also interesting to examine whether electoral uncertainty has a direct effect 
on ICRG and growth in Least Squares regressions. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 in Table 2 show that 
including elections or instability in these regressions results in insignificant estimates for 
these variables (we report that these variables are not significant if used as explanatory   25
variables in the structural equations of Table 1 as well). This basically reproduces the 
findings of the literature and highlights the importance of the fiscal policy channel. 
 
3.6. Robustness  and  extensions 
In this section, we try to address some robustness issues. First, we wish to deal with the issue 
of including investment as an explanatory variable in the growth regression. 
As discussed in sub-section 2.5, our model predicts that capital accumulation and 
growth have the same qualitative properties. So far, we have focused on the growth rate as 
the dependent variable, but it is also interesting to examine the effects of rent seeking on 
investment as well. In addition, since the empirical literature has considered the investment 
share in GDP as a potential determinant of economic growth in growth regressions, we also 
examine the effects of including investment in the growth equation, so that our specification 
is closer to previous empirical work. This can be a useful test, as it can provide information 
on whether the effect of rent seeking on growth is only realized via the disincentives it creates 
for private capital accumulation, or, if there is an additional effect, by hindering the efficient 
allocation of factor inputs in general. For instance, Mauro (1995) finds that if he controls for 
investment in his growth regressions, his measure of extraction activities (the Business 
International indices of corruption) loses its explanatory power, while Knack and Keefer 
(1995) find that the ICRG index retains its statistical significance even if investment is 
controlled for.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Column 1 in Table 3 presents results when investment  is included in the growth 
equation as an explanatory variable.
34 The investment share is not significant, while the 
estimated coefficient of ICRG, although a bit smaller (in absolute value) than Table 1, is still 
significant. The validity of the instruments is again supported by the Hansen test, while the 
AR test rejects the null of joint zero effect of the endogenous variables on the growth rate. 
Obviously, the smaller (in absolute value) coefficient of ICRG is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a part of the effect of ICRG on growth occurs via the disincentives for private 
                                                 
34 According to the theoretical model, as noted above, investment (or the growth rate of capital) is an 
endogenous variable. This would imply that including it as an explanatory variable in a growth regression could 
introduce endogeneity bias in the estimates. Keeping this concern in mind, we note that the main purpose of this 
regression is to contextualize our results vis-a-vis the literature. In practice, it is not easy to find additional 
instruments - that satisfy both the validity and relevance requirements - for investment in the growth regression. 
Such problems are avoided when we consider a regression of investment on govshare and ICRG below.   26
investment. However, these results suggest that rent seeking also seems to induce a 
misallocation of resources that is more general than the decrease in investment. A direct way 
to examine whether rent seeking affects investment in our sample is to consider a regression 
where investment is the dependent variable. Results of such a regression are presented in 
column 2 of Table 3. As can be seen, higher rent seeking activities are indeed a disincentive 
for investment. 
We would also like to examine what happens if we use alternative measures of the 
government fiscal size (so far we have been using the government consumption share in GDP 
from the Penn World Tables). Such an alternative measure can be obtained by using OECD 
data on the government consumption and government investment, to construct the 
government share in GDP (this is denoted as govoecd). An advantage of the Penn World 
Tables data is that they are PPP adjusted and therefore more suitable for international 
comparisons. An additional advantage is that they are available for all the countries and time 
periods we work with, while, in contrast, by using the OECD measure our sample size drops 
from 75 to 65. The advantage from using the OECD data is that we can include government 
investment in the government share in GDP (in practice this is small component of 
government spending, about 2%-3% of GDP for most OECD countries). The results from 
using govoecd are presented in Table 4. As can be seen, the main results still go through. An 
exemption is that elections is not significant in explaining govoecd, but the rest of the results 
and the discussion from the previous analysis using the govshare measure generally carry 
over for the govoecd measure.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
We report that a more general measure of the fiscal size of the government “total 
expenditures of the central government to GDP”, available from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI), is found to be significantly related to the instability proxy but not to 
elections. However, we cannot find evidence that it is related to the ICRG index. This seems 
to suggest that the additional components of government spending included in “total 
expenditures”, i.e. interest payments and transfer payments (which in the OECD largely 
consist of pensions) are not associated with rent seeking. Most of the total government 
expenditure in the OECD is made up of transfer payments (this is, actually, the main 
difference between government consumption spending and total expenditure, see e.g. Tanzi 
and Schuknecht, 2000). When using transfers instead of govshare in the previous regressions,   27
we found indeed that the channel does not work. By contrast, our econometric results suggest 
that the fiscal policy channel of electoral uncertainty works through what Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000) call “real expenditure” or “the part of government spending that absorbs 
or uses economic resources directly” (p. 24). It is an interesting issue for further research to 
carefully investigate which components of government expenditure are causing and which 
are deterring rent seeking activities.
35 
In our analysis so far we have not included country dummies in our regressions as 
control variables, because we want to use both the within and the cross-country information 
in the data. Actually, most of the empirical studies of rent seeking rely on cross-country 
differences, which is completely partialled out if we include country dummies. It is 
interesting however to exploit the time series dimension of the ICRG index and examine 
which of the results hold looking at the within variation only. We would expect the results 
involving the ICRG index to be more sensitive, as the variation of this index across countries 
is larger than within countries. The results from including country dummies are presented in 
Table 5.       
 
Table 5 here 
 
Two points are worth making before discussing the results. First, since we cannot 
include time invariant variables together with the country dummies, we had to drop the 
variables lgdp and surf from the control variable list in our regressions. Regarding surf, we 
use instead a measure of population density, as in e.g. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), that is 
time varying. This variable is obtained by dividing population by surface. Regarding initial 
GDP, we cannot use the initial GDP of each time period, as this would imply using future 
values of an endogenous variable in the system as exogenous regressors. Second, since the 
country effects are not appended any more in the error term, there is no apparent reason to 
expect that the error term will be serially correlated within countries. Hence, we report 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity (we also report that standard errors that 
are robust in addition to arbitrary serial correlation are not very different).
36  
                                                 
35 We do not use tax revenue as a measure of fiscal size, as this is not a good proxy of the distortions that the 
fiscal size exerts on private incentives, especially rent seeking incentives. For instance, Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2001) report empirical evidence that less rent seeking and better institutions increase the tax revenue collected 
by the government. 
36 We present results using govshare only. With govoecd 65 observations are available, which implies that 
adding an additional 25 country dummy set in the control variables results in a big drop in degrees of freedom. 
Estimates are generally insignificant in this case.   28
Starting with the regression for the fiscal size, we see that although both proxies for 
political uncertainty have the correct sign, only the elections variable is significant. No other 
control variable is significant in this regression (except for the time dummies). Looking at the 
GMM regressions for rent seeking, we note that for the results presented in columns 3 and 4 
we have not included agedep in the set of instruments, as the Hansen over-identification test 
rejects in this case. The estimated coefficients for govshare are again positive, but not 
statistically significant. However, it is the AR test that is more important in these regressions, 
as the first stage F-statistics reveal that the instruments are not highly correlated with 
govshare within countries. Then, when instability is used as an instrument for govshare, in 
column 4, the AR test rejects the zero null, hence implying a significant effect from govshare 
to ICRG. We also report that adding agedep in the instrument list increases the first stage F-
statistics and govshare is significant in this case, but, as said above, the validity (Hansen) test 
rejects. Note also that in these regressions only education is significant as a determinant of 
ICRG. Finally, we see that in the growth regression, both govshare and ICRG are negative, 
while the AR test clearly rejects the null. In the investment regression, ICRG is negative and 
significant, while the AR test again rejects the null. Note again that the control variables in 
the growth equation are not significant.  
Overall, we would say that although the results are not as clear when looking at the 
within country variation only, in general they are consistent with the theoretical predictions 
and the previous analysis. 
  
4. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
We have solved a general equilibrium model to study the link between fiscal policy, 
incentives and economic growth in the presence of uncertainty about remaining in power. 
The focus was on the effects of electoral uncertainty and party competition on the choice of 
fiscal policy and rent seeking incentives and in turn on the macro-economy. The main 
prediction is that when a party cares less for voters when out of office, uncertainty about 
remaining in power pushes governments to follow relatively shortsighted policies in the form 
of a larger public sector, which in turn increases rent seeking activities and thus hurts the 
economy.  
This prediction was tested using data for 25 OECD countries for the time period 
1982-1996. The main result is that uncertainty about remaining in power does matter for 
economic outcomes and that its effects take place via the channel of fiscal policy. Consistent   29
with this channel, our evidence here suggests that the fiscal size of the government increases 
extractive activities. Empirical evidence regarding this link has been, so far, fairly weak, 
mainly because of endogeneity problems. We believe that in this paper we have provided 
both a conceptual, theoretical framework to deal with this issue and a valid and relevant 
identification for empirical evaluation. 
We close with some remarks. First, we focused on the adverse effects of electoral 
uncertainty. However, political competition between selfish political parties can also lead to 
the implementation of efficient policies (e.g. elections can control the moral hazard behavior 
of politicians). Here, we have not studied these issues. Hence, the policy message is 
obviously not against elections.  Second, several OECD (especially EU) countries have 
recently announced, or adopted, fiscal policy rules that are expected to reduce the ability of 
policymakers to follow opportunistic policies. It would therefore be interesting to examine, as 
a future extension when more data on recent periods become available, whether these rules 
have been successful in mitigating opportunistic policymaking.  
Finally, we wish to point out that what we found is that larger public sectors, as 
measured by a larger government share in GDP, are bad for incentives and hence indirectly 
bad for growth. However, all government spending need not be bad for incentives, as there 
may be types of expenditure that help to reduce rent seeking (for instance, spending on the 
improvement of the judiciary system or on education). Further research is thus needed on the 
compositional effects of government spending on extractive incentives. Moreover, 
government spending may have important (positive or negative) direct effects on economic 
growth. The study of the growth effects of fiscal policy is a multi-dimensional issue, as it 
depends, among others, on the composition and the efficiency of government spending (see, 
e.g. Angelopoulos et al., 2007a, 2007b).   30
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Firm’s problem 
The first-order conditions with respect to k  and l are simply: 
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Appendix B: Household’s problem 
The first-order conditions include the budget constraint (4) and:   
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Appendix C: Result 1 
The market-clearing conditions are  ∑ ∑
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assume that the number of households equals the number of firms and focus on a symmetric 
equilibrium. Combining (2), (5b), (A.1a) and (A.1b), we get for output: 
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Combining (B.1b), (A.1b), (5c) and (C.1a), we get: 
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Moreover, we conjecture that  t c  and  1 + t k  are proportional to the product 
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) ( 1 , where the assumed degrees of proportionality are time invariant 
undetermined coefficients (see also e.g. McCallum, 1989, pp. 21-22). Substituting these 
conjectures into (B.1a), we obtain:   31
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Also, combining (A.1a), (A.1b), (C.1a), (5b) and (5c), we get: 
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Finally, using (A.1a), (A.1b), (C.1a), (C.1c) and (C.1e) into (4) we get: 
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Appendix D: Result 2 
As usually, we work in two steps.  
 
Step 1: Since the underlying model is log-linear, we guess that the two value functions in 
(7a)-(7b) take the form: 
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where (
N N P P u u u u 1 0 1 0 , , , ) are time-invariant undetermined coefficients. Party  j  solves an 
analogous problem. If we use these conjectures into (7a)-(7b), differentiate the right-hand 
side of (7a) with respect to 
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which includes the undetermined coefficients.  
 
Step 2: We use the above (i.e. the conjectures (D.1a)-(D.1b) for the value functions, as well 
as (D.2) for the control variable) back into the Bellman equations in (7a)-(7b), group terms 
and equate coefficients on both sides. The solution of the Riccati equations gives the values 
of the undetermined coefficients in the guessed value functions. Notice that the crucial   32
coefficients are 
P u1  and 
N u1 ; namely, these are the coefficients that matter in the solution for 
optimal policy in (D.2). The relevant Riccati equations imply:    
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Then, if we go back to (D.2) and substitute for 
P u1  and 
N u1  from (D.3a) and (D.3b), we get 
equation (8) in the main text. 
 
Study of equation (8)  
Total differentiation of equation (8) implies:  
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In general, it is not possible to sign analytically the above two partials and hence the sign of 
q ∂
∂τ . Numerical solutions over the full range of  1 0 < <q  (while all other parameters are as in 
subsection 2.6) are reported in Table D.1 and imply  0 <
∂
∂
q
τ . Notice that the same numerical 
solutions imply that the above two partials, 
τ ∂
∂(.) and 
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∂(.), are both negative, i.e. 
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Appendix E: Endogenous extraction ( t b − 1 ) 
 Following Park et al. (2005), we assume that, in equilibrium,  t b − 1  is a positive function of 
the average (per capita) effort time spent in extraction activities, 
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, in each period 
t. In particular, we assume a linear function of the form: 
J
b
J
j
j
t
t
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−
+ ≡ −
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1 0
) 1 (
1
θ
δ δ                                                                                                    (E.1) 
where  1 0 1 0 < + ≤ δ δ . The constant term,  0 0 ≥ δ , captures the possibility of transfers 
independently of rent seekers’ pressure, while  0 1 ≥ δ  translates lobbies’ effort into actual 
extraction. It is straightforward to show that the CDE (given by (6a)-(6e)) changes to: 
[] [] ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α τ θ δ δ θ τ θ δ δ τ αβ + +
− −
+
− −
+ + − − − − + + − − = t t t t t t t t k A c
1 1
1 0
1
1 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 )] 1 ( [ ) 1 )( 1 (             (E.2a) 
[] ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α τ θ δ δ θ τ αβ + +
− −
+
− −
+ +
+ − − − − = t t t t t t k A k
1 1
1 0
1
1 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (                                   (E.2b) 
0
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 1
1 0 2 =
−
+
+ + −
−
t
t
t
t
t t
t τ δ
τ ε
θ
τ δ
τ δ δ τ ε
θ                                                              (E.2c) 
[] ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α ε α τ θ τ θ δ δ + +
− −
+ + + − − − = t t t t t t k A g
1 1 1
1 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 1                                                      (E.2d) 
[] ε α
α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε α
ε
ε α τ θ δ δ θ τ θ δ δ + +
− −
+
− −
+ + − − + = t t t t t t t k A e
1 1
1 0
1
1 0 ) ( 1 ) (                                           (E.2e) 
 
Study of equation (E.2c) 
Assume that τ  is time invariant (we show below that this is indeed the case) so that θ  is also 
time invariant. Equation (E.2c) is then a second-order polynomial in θ . Assuming existence, 
there are two roots, say  1 θ  and  2 θ , where: 
0
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(E.3a)-(E.3b) imply that  1 θ  and  2 θ  are both positive. Then, if the product  ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 1 − − θ θ  is 
negative, one root is higher than 1, and one root is less than 1. It can be easily shown by 
using (E.3a)-(E.3b) that this is indeed the case, and hence there is only one well-defined   34
solution, that is one root less than unity. Working with this root, total differentiation of (E.2c) 
implies: 
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Policy and general equilibrium with exogenous re-election probabilities and endogenous 
extraction 
Working as in subsection 2.6 and Appendix D it is straightforward to show that in a Markov-
perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between the two political parties, in 
which the degree of extraction is determined endogenously as in (E.1), the income tax rate, 
τ , is constant over time and is a solution to: 
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(E.5)  
where θ  follows from (E.2c) and  τ θ  is given by (E.4a). The solution for τ , in combination 
with the DCE in (E.2a)-(E.2e), gives a general equilibrium. Notice that equations (E.5) and 
(E.2c) constitute a system of two equations in τ  and θ  only. Since this system is non-linear 
and cannot be solved analytically, we solve it numerically by using the parameter values 
already used in subsection 2.6. Regarding  0 δ  and  1 δ  we use the values used by Park et al. 
(2005) that is  5 . 0 0 = δ  and  2 . 0 1 = δ . Then equations (E.5) and (E.2c) give  100 . 0 = τ  and 
896 . 0 = θ  respectively.  
 
Study of equation (E.5)  
We now study the comparative static properties of (E.5). Total differentiation of equation 
(E.5) implies:  
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where the partials are:    35
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where 
P u1  and 
N u1  are the same as in (D.3a)-(D.3b) and where  τ θ  and  ττ θ  follow from (E.4a) 
and (E.4b) respectively. 
In general, it is not possible to sign analytically the above two partials and hence the sign of 
q ∂
∂τ . Numerical solutions are reported in Table E.1 and imply  0 <
∂
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τ . Notice that the same 
numerical solutions imply that the above two partials, 
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Appendix F: Result 3 
We work as above but now we get an approximate solution only. Specifically, we get a first-
order approximate solution around its long run. We work in three steps: First, given the 
structure of the model, we assume that the value functions in (10a)-(10b) are log-linear in the 
state variables,  t k  and  t q . In turn, we derive the optimality condition in (10a), impose 
symmetricity ex post, and take a first-order approximation of this optimality condition. 
Second, we solve for the long run. Third, we take a first-order approximation of the Bellman 
equations in (10a)-(10b), use into them the approximate expressions from the first step, group 
terms and equate coefficients on both sides. The solution of the Riccati equations will give 
the values of the undetermined coefficients of the value functions that can approximately 
solve the problem.   
 
Step 1: We use the log-linear value functions:  
t
P
t
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where the  s u'  are time-invariant undetermined coefficients. There are analogous conjectures 
for party  j . If we use these value functions into (10a)–(10b), differentiate the right-hand side 
of (10a) with respect to the control variable 
i
t τ , impose the ex post symmetry conditions 
j
t
i
t τ τ = , 
j i P P P u u u = = , 
j i N N N u u u = = , and take a first-order linear approximation of this 
optimality condition  around the long-run solution presented below in step 2, we obtain 
equation (11) in the text, where (upper bars denote long-run values):  
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Step 2: Long-run solution. We define the long run to be a situation in which all variables do 
not change (for any variable  t x ,  x denotes its long-run value) and in which  5 . 0 0 ≡ = q q  (in 
the long run,  c V V
N P log = − ). This solution is the solution of subsection 2.6 under 
exogenous re-election probabilities (see Appendix D) if we also set  5 . 0 ≡ q . In turn, having 
solved for the long-run tax rate, τ , we can obtain the long-run solutions for the effort time, 
the capital stock and the consumption as follows: 
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Step 3: In this step, (i) we use (F.1a)-(F.1b) into (10a)-(10b); (ii) we linearize (10a)-(10b) 
around the long-run solution and substitute for  t τˆ  from equation (11) in the main text; (iii) we 
group terms and equate coefficients on  t k ˆ  and  t q ˆ  on both sides of the two linearized Bellman 
equations. The resulting Ricatti equations will enable us to get a solution for the 
undetermined coefficients. In particular, we obtain the following four Ricatti equations in 
P u1 , 
P u2 , 
N u1  and 
N u2 . 
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where 
1
2
21 Ω
Ω
= Ω , and 
1
3
31 Ω
Ω
= Ω . 
(F.4a)-(F.4b) constitute a non-linear equation system that cannot be solved analytically. 
Therefore we solve it numerically by using the same parameter values as in subsection 2.6. 
Regarding  ρ  and γ , we set  8 . 0 = ρ  and  5 . 0 = γ  (we report that our results are robust to the 
parameter values chosen). After having a numerical solution for the undetermined 
coefficients, we can go back to (F.2a)-(F.2c) to calculate numerically the signs of  1 Ω ,  2 Ω  
and  3 Ω . Numerical results are reported in Table F.1 below. 
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Notice that equation (11) in the main text implies 
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Appendix G: Data description.  
We have collected data for 25 OECD countries, over the years 1982-1996 (where the choice 
of the time period is dictated by the availability of the rent-seeking index). The countries are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.We use three 
5-year periods/observations for each country.  
Growth rate: The Penn World Tables (PWT), version 6.1 (see Heston et al., 2002) dataset 
provides us with the real GDP per capita in constant prices, which is then used to obtain the 
five-year average of annual growth rates. 
Size of government (govshare): We use the Penn World Tables measure of the government 
share in GDP in constant prices, averaged over the 5-year period. This is the general 
government consumption component of GDP and includes spending on goods and services 
like education and health (e.g. the salaries of professors and doctors and spending on non-
capital goods), national defense, public administration, police and the judiciary system. It 
does not include capital formation by the government, as this item is included in the Penn 
World Tables in the “investment share in GDP in constant prices”. 
Size of government (govoecd): We use OECD data (obtained from the Economic Outlook 
No. 81) on government consumption, government investment and GDP in constant prices, to 
construct the government share in GDP. This is averaged over the -year periods. 
ICRG: We use the IRIS dataset (version IRIS-3, obtained by countrydata.com). This index 
contains annual values for indicators of the quality of governance, corruption and violation of 
property rights over the period 1982-1997, as constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS 
Center, University of Maryland, from monthly ICRG data provided by Political Risk 
Services. There are five subjective indices available by the IRIS dataset: “corruption in 
government”, “rule of law”, “risk of repudiation of government contracts”, “risk of   39
expropriation” and “quality of bureaucracy”, with higher scores indicating better outcomes. 
Note that from these indices, “corruption in government”, “rule of law”, and “quality of 
bureaucracy” range in value from 0 to 6, whereas “risk of repudiation of government 
contracts” and “risk of expropriation” are scaled from 0 to 10. The aggregate measure of rent 
seeking is then constructed from these variables at a 50-point scale by first converting 
“corruption in government”, “rule of law”, and “quality of bureaucracy” to a 10-point scale 
and summing them up with the other two indices. This variable is then multiplied by -1, so 
that higher scores indicate worse incentives (more rent seeking). 
Elections: We have collected data on elections for the 25 OECD countries for the time period 
1982-1997 from various sources, since we have found that there are some differences 
between the datasets available, regarding the dates of elections. Our principal source is the 
Database on Political Institutions (DPI) (see Beck et al. 2000). Other useful sources include 
the Elections Results Archive, developed by the Center on Demographic Performance at 
Binghamton University (cdp.binghamton.edu/era) and the International Institute for 
Demography and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm). Here, we use the series 
legelec (the date when there were legislative elections) in the original DPI dataset, except for 
the following cases (where we have cross checked with other databases): 
Greece: In 1989, there were elections held in both June and November, but the DPI reports 
only the June elections. In 1990, there were elections held in April, which are not reported in 
DPI. There were no elections in 1995, as DPI reports. 
Ireland: In 1982 there were elections both in February and November (on Ireland, see also 
www.electionsireland.org). DPI reports elections only in February. 
Netherlands: DPI reports elections in May 1991. This is not confirmed in any other dataset on 
elections we have looked at. 
USA: We use only the presidential elections, as is customary in the literature (see e.g. Alesina 
et al. (1997)). 
We then construct a pre-election dummy that takes the value of one at the year before the 
election and zero otherwise. Specifically, suppose that there is an election held in a country in 
month x of a given year. Then, the year of the election is assigned the value x/12, and the 
previous year the value (12-x)/12. Elections is the average of this pre-election dummy over 
the five-year period. 
Instability:  This is obtained from Beck et al. (2001). It measures the extent of turnover in 
any one year of a government’s key decision makers, by dividing the number of exits 
between year t and t+1, by the total number of veto players in year t. The variable is on a 0-1   40
scale, with zero representing no exits and one representing the exit and replacement of all 
veto players. Thus, higher values indicate more instability. The average of this variable over 
the 5-year periods is used. 
lgdp: This is the logarithm of initial level of GDP in each country (the 1981 observation). It is 
obtained from the Penn World Tables, using the real GDP per capita in constant prices.  
Political freedom (gastil): gastil is the 5-year average of the negative of the Gastil index 
developed by the Freedom House, so that higher scores imply more political freedom. The 
Gastil index is available at www.freedomhouse.org 
Openness: The data are obtained from  the Penn World Tables. Openness is the sum of 
exports plus imports (in constant prices) over GDP (in constant prices). We use the average 
value over the 5-year period.   
Education: We use the average years of education in the beginning of each 5-year period for 
each country. Data are available from the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset, available at 
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
Age dependency ratio: This is the ratio of dependents - people younger than 15 and older than 
64 - to the working-age population - those aged 15-64, averaged over the time periods. This is 
available from the World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Surface: The area of a country, in thousands of km
2, obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
Investment share: The share of investment in GDP, averaged over the 5-year periods, is 
obtained from the Penn World Tables. 
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Table D.1 
General equilibrium with exogenous re-election probabilities 
q  τ   θ  
1 . 0   110 . 0   889 . 0  
2 . 0   108 . 0   891 . 0  
3 . 0   107 . 0   892 . 0  
4 . 0   105 . 0   894 . 0  
5 . 0   104 . 0   895 . 0  
6 . 0   102 . 0   897 . 0  
7 . 0   100 . 0   899 . 0  
8 . 0   098 . 0   901 . 0  
9 . 0   095 . 0   904 . 0  
  Notes:  4 . 0 = α ,  5 . 0 = ε ,  9 . 0 = β ,  5 . 0 = b  and  3 = A .  
 
Table E.1  
General equilibrium with exogenous re-election probabilities and endogenous extraction 
q  τ   θ  
1 . 0   106 . 0   889 . 0  
2 . 0   105 . 0   890 . 0  
3 . 0   103 . 0   892 . 0  
4 . 0   101 . 0   894 . 0  
5 . 0   100 . 0   896 . 0  
6 . 0   098 . 0   897 . 0  
7 . 0   096 . 0   900 . 0  
8 . 0   094 . 0   902 . 0  
9 . 0   092 . 0   904 . 0  
  Notes:  4 . 0 = α ,  5 . 0 = ε ,  9 . 0 = β ,  5 . 0 0 = δ ,  2 . 0 1 = δ , and  3 = A .  
 
Table F.1 
Numerical Solution of 
P u1 , 
N u1 , 
P u2 , 
N u2 , τ , θ , k , c ,  1 Ω ,  2 Ω  and  3 Ω  
P u1   578 . 0  
N u1   146 . 0  
P u2   041 . 0  
N u2   003 . 0 −  
τ   104 . 0  
θ   895 . 0  
k   582 . 0  
c   129 . 1  
1 Ω   574 . 1 −  
2 Ω   151 . 0 −  
3 Ω   013 . 0  
Notes:  4 . 0 = α ,  5 . 0 = ε ,  9 . 0 = β ,  5 . 0 = b ,  3 = A ,  5 . 0 = γ  and  8 . 0 = q ρ .    42
TABLE 1: The effects of electoral uncertainty on government’s fiscal size, rent seeking and economic growth (basic results) 
Dep. variable: 
fiscal size 
(govshare) 
(1) 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Least 
Squares 
Dep. variable: 
rent seeking 
(ICRG) 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
Dep. variable: 
growth rate 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
GMM 
elections  10.688**  
(4.917) 
-  govshare  0.299** 
(0.067) 
0.307** 
(0.062) 
govshare   0.050  
(0.088) 
0.047  
(0.093) 
instability  - 7.074**   
(3.490) 
Gastil  -2.152** 
(0.839) 
-2.099** 
(0.726) 
ICRG  -0.451** 
(0.095) 
-0.443** 
(0.111) 
lgdp  -0.554  
(2.309) 
-0.473  
(2.152) 
Lgdp  -5.746** 
(1.503) 
-6.471** 
(1.569) 
lgdp  -7.201** 
(0.836) 
-7.520** 
(0.979) 
openness  0.095** 
(0.025) 
0.094** 
(0.026) 
openness  -0.080** 
(0.013) 
-0.081** 
(0.012) 
openness  -0.019  
(0.012) 
-0.022  
(0.013) 
agedep  6.338  
(7.944) 
5.471  
(7.149) 
education  -0.919**  
(0.253) 
-0.919**  
(0.248) 
education  0.067  
(0.216) 
0.064  
(0.212) 
surface  0.0004** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005** 
(0.0001) 
Constant  15.420  
(15.054) 
22.303  
(15.406) 
D(87-91)  0.208  
(0.442) 
0.255  
(0.455) 
D(87-91)  -3.193** 
(0.893) 
-3.290** 
(0.780) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 4 ( χ = 4.410 
(0.353) 
2
) 4 ( χ = 3.013 
(0.555) 
D(92-96)  -1.539* 
(0.832) 
-1.509* 
(0.857) 
D(92-96)  -6.200** 
(1.063) 
-6.453** 
(1.061) 
C- orthogonality 
test (time dummies) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 2.403 
(0.3007) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 1.135 
(0.567) 
constant  50.956** 
(6.996) 
54.643** 
(6.671) 
constant  8.202  
(25.177) 
9.947  
(23.254) 
First-stage  
F-statistic 
) 24 , 5 ( F =29.84
(0.000) 
) 24 , 5 ( F =30.89 
(0.000) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 2 ( χ = 2.878 
(0.2371) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 3.694 
(0.1577) 
     AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 5 ( χ = 50.75  
(0.000) 
2
) 5 ( χ = 57.02 
(0.000) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (ICRG) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 4.95 
(0.004) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 4.97 
(0.004) 
          First-stage  
F-statistic (govshare) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 5.39 
(0.003) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 5.45 
(0.002) 
          AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 34.41 
(0.000) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 27.52 
(0.000) 
Notes: 1. There are 75 observations. 2. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficients. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level. 3.  In column (3), the instruments used to 
identify govshare in the GMM estimation are elections, agedep, surface, D(87-91) and D(92-96). In column (4), the instruments used to identify govshare are instability, 
agedep, surface, D(87-91) and D(92-96). In column (5), the instruments used to identify govshare and ICRG are elections, agedep, surface and gastil. In column (6), the   43
instruments used to identify govshare and ICRG are instability, agedep, surface and gastil. 4. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.Under the null, the test 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions (the p-value is reported in parenthesis. Hansen’s statistic reported in this Table is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and intra-country serial correlation.  5. The C statistic is used to test for the exogeneity of a subset of instruments (here for the exogeneity of the time 
dummies).Under the null that the additional, suspect instruments are valid, the C statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of instruments tested (the p-value is 
reported in parenthesis). The C statistic reported here is the difference of the Hansen statistic of the equations with and without the time dummies. 6. The 1
st stage F-statistic 
tests the hypothesis that the coefficients on all the excluded instruments are zero in the 1
st stage regression of the endogenous regressor on all instruments (the p-value is 
reported in parenthesis). This regression is robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-country serial correlation 7. AR is the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic, a test of the 
significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation that is robust to the presence of weak instruments. Under the null that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, the Anderson-Rubin statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom the number of excluded 
instruments. The Anderson-Rubin statistic reported is robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-country serial correlation.  
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TABLE 2: Least Squares estimation of the rent seeking and growth regressions 
Dep. variable: 
rent seeking 
(ICRG) 
(1) 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Least 
Squares  
(3) 
Least 
Squares  
Dep. 
variable: 
growth rate
(4) 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Least 
Squares 
(6) 
Least 
Squares
govshare  0.130** 
(0.065) 
0.123* 
(0.071) 
0.135** 
(0.065) 
govshare   -0.051  
(0.037) 
-0.046  
(0.038) 
-0.046  
(0.038) 
gastil  -2.159** 
(0.832) 
-2.159** 
(0.832) 
-2.093** 
(0.831) 
ICRG  -0.132* 
(0.072) 
-0.130* 
(0.072) 
-0.140** 
(0.071) 
lgdp  -5.484** 
(1.786) 
-5.418** 
(1.817) 
-5.547** 
(1.839) 
Lgdp  -4.272** 
(1.044) 
-4.256** 
(1.052) 
-4.322** 
(1.025) 
openness  -0.064** 
(0.018) 
-0.063** 
(0.019) 
-0.066** 
(0.018) 
openness  0.006  
(0.007) 
0.005  
(0.007) 
0.005  
(0.007) 
education  -1.036**  
(0.214) 
-1.034**  
(0.212) 
-1.100**  
(0.223) 
education  0.232  
(0.176) 
0.230  
(0.175) 
0.197  
(0.181) 
elections  - 2.186 
(3.829) 
-  elections  - -1.377 
(1.272) 
- 
instability  - -  -3.777 
(3.559) 
instability  - -  -1.415 
(1.434) 
constant  15.090  
(17.588) 
13.744  
(18.705) 
16.963  
(18.186) 
D(87-91)  -0.015  
(0.370) 
-0.012  
(0.352) 
-0.006  
(0.360) 
      D(92-96)  -1.388** 
(0.432) 
-1.362** 
(0.433) 
-1.329** 
(0.432) 
      constant  35.714** 
(8.235) 
36.019** 
(8.327) 
36.326** 
(8.011) 
Notes: 1. There are 75 observations. 2. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary intra-country serial correlation are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. An asterisk 
denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level.   45
TABLE 3: Economic growth, rent seeking and private investment 
Dep. variable: 
growth rate 
(1) 
GMM 
Dep. variable: 
investment 
(2) 
GMM 
govshare   0.071  
(0.080) 
govshare   -0.468  
(0.274) 
ICRG  -0.334** 
(0.135) 
ICRG  -1.158** 
(0.309) 
Lgdp  -5.993** 
(1.414) 
Lgdp  -10.498* 
(5.442) 
Openness  -0.012  
(-0.99) 
Openness  -0.0605  
(0.036 
Education  0.046  
(0.197) 
Education  -0.598  
(0.508) 
D(87-91)  0.090  
(0.432) 
D(87-91)  -1.204  
(1.306) 
D(92-96)  -1.120  
(0.747) 
D(92-96)  -5.545  
(2.467 
Investment  0.080 
(0.053) 
Constant  42.216** 
(4.05) 
Constant  42.216** 
(10.422) 
   
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 2 ( χ = 2.850 
(0.240) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 2 ( χ = 3.344 
(0.187) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (ICRG) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 1.81 
(0.158) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (ICRG) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 4.95 
(0.004) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (govshare) 
) 24 , 4 ( F = 3.85 
(0.014) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (govshare)
) 24 , 4 ( F = 5.39 
(0.003) 
AR test (robust to 
weak instruments)  
2
) 4 ( χ = 12.10 
(0.016) 
AR test (robust to 
weak instruments)  
2
) 4 ( χ = 34.51 
(0.000) 
Notes: See the notes in Table 1. The instruments used to identify the endogenous variables in  the GMM estimation 
are elections, agedep, surface and gastil. 
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TABLE 4: The effects of electoral uncertainty on government’s fiscal size, rent seeking and economic growth (using OECD data for 
fiscal size) 
Dep. variable: 
fiscal size 
(govoecd) 
(1) 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Least 
Squares 
Dep. variable: 
rent seeking 
(ICRG) 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
Dep. variable: 
growth rate 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
GMM 
elections  -1.981  
(3.530) 
-  Govoecd  0.606** 
(0.227) 
0.386** 
(0.139) 
govoecd   -0.137 
(0.195) 
-0.275 
(0.213) 
instability  - 9.944**   
(5.126) 
Gastil  -3.632** 
(1.053) 
-3.079** 
(0.883) 
ICRG     -0.294*   
(0.164) 
-0.362**  
(0.175) 
lgdp  4.344 
(2.806) 
4.171 
(2.680) 
Lgdp  -5.238** 
(2.599) 
-5.183** 
(2.179) 
lgdp  -6.908** 
(1.659) 
-6.667** 
(1.682) 
openness  0.061** 
(0.017) 
0.069** 
(0.015) 
openness  -0.103** 
(0.031) 
-0.087** 
(0.026) 
openness  0.004  
(0.015) 
0.010  
(0.016) 
agedep  4.952  
(11.239) 
9.719 
(0.80) 
education  -1.197**  
(0.302) 
-1.184**  
(0.314) 
education  0.367** 
 (0.152) 
0.206 
 (0.196) 
surface  -0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
D(87-91)  - -  D(87-91)  -0.289  
(0.602) 
-0.630 
(0.643) 
D(87-91)  -1.565** 
(0.587) 
-1.535** 
(0.630) 
D(92-96)  - - D(92-96)  -1.870** 
(0.761) 
-2.301** 
(0811) 
D(92-96)  -2.002**  
(0.926) 
-2.006**  
(0.893) 
Constant  2.288 
(24.919) 
6.381  
(21.569) 
constant  55.543** 
(9.409) 
54.731** 
(9.540) 
constant  -21.927 
(25.422) 
-21.315 
(24.131) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 4 ( χ = 4.274 
(0.370) 
2
) 4 ( χ = 4.322 
(0.115) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 2 ( χ = 2.596 
(0.273) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 0.715 
(0.699) 
     C- orthogonality 
test (time dummies) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 1.817 
(0.403) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 2.361 
(0.307) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (ICRG) 
) 21 , 4 ( F =16.25 
(0.000) 
) 21 , 4 ( F =8.58 
(0.000) 
     First-stage  
F-statistic 
) 21 , 5 ( F =4.41 
(0.006) 
) 24 , 5 ( F =3.30 
(0.023) 
First-stage  
F-statistic (govshare) 
) 21 , 4 ( F = 2.58 
(0.067) 
) 21 , 4 ( F = 1.41 
(0.263) 
     AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 5 ( χ = 70.62 
(0.000) 
2
) 5 ( χ = 79.90 
(0.000) 
AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 15.53 
(0.003) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 13.97 
(0.007) 
Notes: As in Table 1, except that govoecd has replaced govshare and that t here are 65 observations. 
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TABLE 5: The effects of electoral uncertainty on government’s fiscal size, rent seeking and economic growth (controlling for country 
effects) 
Dep. variable: 
fiscal size 
(govshare) 
(1) 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Least 
Squares 
Dep. variable: 
rent seeking 
(ICRG) 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
Dep. variables: 
growth rate or 
investment 
(5) 
GMM 
Dep. variable: 
growth rate 
(6) 
GMM 
Dep. variable: 
investment 
elections  7.173*  
(3.892) 
-  govshare  0.080 
(0.119) 
0.145 
(0.136) 
govshare   -0.428**  
(0.142) 
0.517  
(0.291) 
instability  - 2.059   
(3.530) 
Gastil  -0.419 
(1.085) 
-1.020 
(1.081) 
ICRG  -0.023  
(0.123) 
-1.106** 
(0.176) 
openness  -0.093 
(0.088) 
-0.088 
(0.100) 
openness  -0.051 
(0.036) 
-0.033 
(0.041) 
openness  0.032  
(0.037) 
0.035  
(0.061) 
agedep  11.527  
(14.918) 
12.185  
(15.839) 
education  -2.464**  
(1.036) 
-2.562**  
(1.057) 
education  0.551  
(0.761) 
-3.341**  
(0.806) 
density  0.108 
(0.074) 
0.099 
(0.080) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 3 ( χ = 6.145 
(0.104) 
2
) 3 ( χ = 4.759 
(0.190) 
D(87-91)  -1.270**  
(0.547) 
3.139**  
(1.120) 
D(87-91)  -2.313** 
(0.806) 
-2.384** 
(0.814) 
First-stage  
F-statistic 
) 43 , 4 ( F =2.04 
(0.105) 
) 43 , 4 ( F =1.27 
(0.298) 
D(92-96)  -3.644** 
(0.940) 
1.886 
(1.632) 
D(92-96)  -4.082** 
(1.422) 
-4.202** 
(1.561) 
AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 4 ( χ = 6.64 
(0.156) 
2
) 4 ( χ = 8.98 
(0.061) 
Hansen over-
identification test 
2
) 2 ( χ = 0.775 
(0.678) 
2
) 2 ( χ = 3.703 
(0.157) 
          First-stage  
F-statistic (ICRG) 
) 42 , 4 ( F = 5.63 
(0.001) 
) 42 , 4 ( F = 5.63 
(0.001) 
          First-stage  
F-statistic (govshare) 
) 42 , 4 ( F = 1.50 
(0.218) 
) 42 , 4 ( F = 1.50 
(0.218) 
          AR test (robust to 
weak instruments) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 25.90 
(0.000) 
2
) 4 ( χ  = 107.39 
(0.000) 
Notes:1. All regressions include a dummy for each country. There are 75 observations. 2. Standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity are shown in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficients. An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level and two asterisks at the 5% level. 3. In column (3), the instruments used to 
identify govshare in the GMM estimation are elections, density, D(87-91) and D(92-96). In column (4), the instruments used to identify govshare are instability, density, 
D(87-91) and D(92-96). In columns (5) and (6), the instruments used to identify govshare and ICRG are elections, agedep, gastil and density.4. The Hansen statistics 
reported in this Table are robust to heteroskedasticity. 5. The F-statistics are obtained from 1
st stage regressions that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 6. The Anderson and 
Rubin (1949) statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity.   48
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